Lessons Learned or Lessons Re-learned: the Choice is Ours

by Victor Chrjapin PE, PMP, URS Washington Division

THIS TREATISE EXAMINES LESSONS LEARNED throughout the US nuclear construction industry by briefly examining the historical process and outputs from the previous nuclear era through the present day. No rigorous, standardized lessons learned program existed during the initial period of nuclear construction. With the onset of the nuclear renaissance, the industry has the opportunity to obtain and evaluate lessons learned from all sources. This approach maximizes the potential for a successful, robust US nuclear program.

URS-Washington Division Nuclear History

The URS Washington Division was formed when URS Corporation acquired, in November 2007, Washington Group International, which itself included the heritage of several major nuclear E&C firms, including Ebasco, UE&C, Westinghouse Government Services, Gibbs & Hill, and Catalytic. These companies represent 35,000MW of new nuclear capacity in the US and around the world, including the first units in Italy, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, and Taiwan. The Washington Division has helped to support valuable nuclear assets through maintenance and major modification programs, including steam generator replacements, gaining national recognition as Power Engineering's Best Nuclear Projects of 2005 and 2006, a Power magazine top plant of 2007, and Platt's Global Energy, ENR/McGraw Hill's 2006 Energy Construction Project of the Year. In addition to continuing its support to the existing fleet, the Washington Division is constructing major segments of the National Enrichment Facility in New Mexico, participating in the Watts Bar 2 completion team, and providing professional services to both GEH and MHI as they prepare their new reactor designs for the nuclear renaissance market.

Lessons Learned From the Previous Nuclear Era

The previous era of US nuclear construction consisted of numerous contractors and utilities building the current fleet of nuclear plants over a period of approximately 25 years. Generally, construction lessons learned did not formally carry over from one utility to the next due to a variety of reasons, ranging from pride to confidentiality. There were some obvious lessons learned since several utilities developed construction management capabilities, but there were no formal programs to capture these lessons. Much of these construction lessons learned could be considered "tribal knowledge," either retained directly by the constructor or not documented. This lack of rigor can be attributed to factors ranging from proprietary information to pride in ability. Companies that participated in the previous program benefited from incremental process and procedure changes, much of it driven by the learning process associated with implementation of the detailed requirements of 10CFR50 which went into effect in the early 1970s. The existence of these incrementally revised processes and procedures provides these companies with an advantage over companies currently seeking to enter this market. These processes and procedures may also explain the lack of significant quality issues associated with current US nuclear construction.

Interviews with construction personnel from this early nuclear era reveal that few, if any, lessons learned were retained in a typical database format, let alone shared with the industry.

The accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2, spurred several avenues for lessons learned. The Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INPO), formed in 1979 as a utility-sponsored and funded organization, conducted a pilot program to evaluate design control, construction, and other related areas in nuclear plant construction (later known as the Construction Project Evaluation [CPE]). INPO's evaluation results were published in 1983 and 1984, near the end of the era. Later, INPO focused on sharing operational experience (OE) between utility members which has proven very effective in elevating industry performance.

At Congress' request, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) studied programs for improving quality assurance of design and construction of commercial nuclear power plants. This study focused on determining the underlying problems in construction and the untimely detection and correction of quality-related items at some plants. The resulting document was published as NUREG-1055 in May 1984, also near the end of the era.

The Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned a study to determine why construction at St. Lucie was accomplished with greater success than peer plants and facilities, primarily in the cost and schedule arenas. The study results were documented in the Energy Economic Data Base (EEDB). Although not a compilation of lessons learned, this document provided a macroscopic understanding of the significant rise in costs. (For a compilation of high level lessons learned, see L. Tsakiris—Doing it Right in Nuclear Construction.)

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) was heavily involved with lessons learned in the 1980s, focused on determining why some nuclear projects were better than others. Except for recommending simplification and modularization, the EPRI efforts provided "global" requirements to be interpreted and implemented by nuclear plant designers, not issues of construction planning and implementation, as summarized in the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Requirements document.

A review of lessons learned from the first nuclear era finds little, if anything, from individual plants. The SNUPPS concept envisioned to capitalize on lessons learned and standardized plant design, never fully came to fruition. Similarly, E&C companies originated little lessons learned information. The collected information presumably was not retained after the era ended, with the only vestiges contained in documents from INPO, the NRC and DOE.

Nuclear Construction Lessons Learned in the Last 20 Years

The last 20 years have not seen noteworthy nuclear construction activity in the US. Significant US projects with a nuclear construction influence include large component replacements/modifications, the recent start-up of TVA's Brown's Ferry, and numerous DOE projects.

Replacing steam generators (SG) and reactor pressure vessel heads (RPVH) has resulted in a significant collection of lessons learned ranging from human performance to technical issues. INPO assisted with a framework to meet the utilities' desires for capture and sharing of information. These lessons learned programs became detailed and comprehensive with input from utilities and contractors, and sharing the information has resulted in SG replacements with significant personal injury, cost, dose and schedule reductions. Although contractors have a more detailed collection of lessons learned (driven somewhat by proprietary and competitive sensitive information), the overall program is viable and valuable. The impact of lessons learned has been similar to the results of the utilities sharing OE and has provided utilities with predictability in quality, cost and schedule.

The Browns Ferry startup resulted in lessons learned based more on regional and direct utility. With the exception of the recent TVA decision to start up Watts Bar-2, the Browns Ferry project was one-of-a-kind with limited transference of true construction lessons learned, although Watts Bar-2 will profit from Browns Ferry lessons learned.

Prior DOE projects have provided some lessons learned from nuclear project construction. The governing criteria for those projects were imposed by the DOE with influence from the NRC. However, perceived applicability by the commercial nuclear industry has been minimal to date partially due to a lack of direct communication between DOE facilities and commercial nuclear plants.

The Construction Industry Institute (CII) has been instrumental in promoting increased effectiveness and efficiency in the engineering and construction industry. This consortium of over 100 leading owner, engineering-contractor, and supplier firms conducts research and related activities to find better ways of planning and executing capital construction programs. The best practices developed by CII are the culmination of capturing lessons learned from numerous member organizations. In addition to influencing collaboration among competitors, CII's efforts have resulted in significant improvements in personal safety, schedule adherence, cost control and quality.

Internationally, lessons learned from nuclear construction are mixed. Until the recent renewed US interest, there was limited information available regarding international nuclear construction. The successful Japanese construction of ABWRs and PWRs has been the topic of numerous seminars and presentations focusing on lessons learned around schedule compression, specifically modularization and over-the-top construction techniques—two schedule compression techniques touted in the INPO reports of the mid-1980s. Details of the Japanese lessons learned have been somewhat limited due to proprietary and competition sensitive information.

Construction projects at Lungmen and North Korea have resulted in virtually no lessons learned that are readily available for US use. Their applicability is questionable due to foreign government intervention and their uniqueness.

The latest construction project garnering attention is Finland's Olkiluoto-3. Lessons learned from that project are relatively forthcoming, primarily as a direct result of Finnish regulator STUK. Although the quantity of lessons learned is somewhat limited, the quality appears excellent with a significant amount of applicability to upcoming US projects. The Finns have experienced several issues currently being discussed here, and some US industry leaders believe the success of the US nuclear renaissance will be directly influenced by Olkiluoto.

A New Approach is Needed

The nuclear renaissance's success may be based on the resolution of several issues facing today's industry, and the spotlight is shining on the collaboration efforts of participants in the US nuclear industry. Success depends on building on the last 20 years as the nuclear industry has become more open and collaborative. Information sharing has been instrumental in shortening outage durations, completing successful major equipment modifications, and mitigating challenges of all types.

To build on these collaborative successes since the last nuclear construction era, all participants in the upcoming renaissance must share information. This information must have some level of commonality for classification and capture criteria in order to be valid industry-wide. The ability to access this information must be unrestricted except for items of security, intellectual property and true competition issues.

Many industry professionals are unaware of the four nuclear construction projects ongoing in the United States:

*Nuclear Enrichment Facility (NEF), Eunice, New Mexico

*Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU), INL, Idaho

*Waste Processing Facility (WPF), Hanford Reservation, Washington, and

*Mixed Oxide Facility, Savannah River Site, South Carolina

Each of these projects is well along in the design phase and is currently under construction. All have placed safety related concrete, are directly applicable to the upcoming construction of new nuclear power plants, and appear to be proceeding without significant quality and/or other learning curve issues. These projects have all the attributes required in the next generation of nuclear construction, issues relating to construction technology, skilled labor availability, specification conformance, vendor performance, etc. The success of these projects will help determine the viability of a national major nuclear construction initiative; sharing lessons learned is imperative.

Initial discussions among companies engaged in these projects show this willingness to share. Collaboration requires overcoming several challenges—proprietary/competitive information issues (a significant issue), a repository/collection site, topic standardization and information access restrictions, and dealing with several government entities. While the benefits for each contributor are significant, the benefits to the much-anticipated nuclear renaissance can be monumental.

Conclusion

INPO provided an effective framework for capturing and using lessons learned that has been refined in the last 20 years. The engineering and construction industry will be well served to use a similar framework to capture the lessons learned from the four nuclear projects currently under construction in the US.

The industry also will be well served by reviewing all previous lessons learned for relevance and applicability. Similarly, continued evaluation of lessons from Japan and Finland, considered within context, will assist in rounding out the industry's preparatory efforts.

CII has reinforced that planning is vital to success in the construction industry. A small, but important, portion of that planning requires evaluating lessons learned and adjusting plans accordingly. Implementing lessons learned from contemporary projects is an important piece of that evaluation and should not be discounted.

References

Construction Industry Institute (CII) website: www.construction-institute.org

Fisicaro, James. "Lessons Learned for Past and Present Construction." Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). October 2006

Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), "Important Findings, Construction Project Evaluation." January 1984.

Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), "Results of Self-Initiated Evaluation: Construction Project Evaluation Program Phase I." February 1983.

Lochbaum, David. "Nuclear Revival or Nuclear Re-run." Union of Concerned Scientists. October 16, 2006

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NRC Information Notice 2007-04 "Construction Experience Related to the Assurance of Quality in the Construction of Nuclear Facilities."

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NUREG 1055 "Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants. A Report to Congress." May 1984.

Tsakiris, L. "Doing it Right in Nuclear Construction." May 15, 1984. Presented at the ASCE 1984 Spring Convention.

United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., "Phase IX Update (1987) Report for the Energy Economic Data Base Program" (July 1988). Also, "Phase x Update Report" (September 1989).